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I.

Introduction

Small drones—”microdrones”—are taking the United States by storm.
Thousands, maybe tens of thousands, of people are buying them on ecommerce
sites and trying them out. They are not hard to fly in benign environments.
They can take off with the push of a button, hover automatically when the
controls are released, and automatically return to the launching point when
something goes wrong.
In many cases, the purchasers view them merely as high-tech toys. Many,
however, discover that their onboard HD video cameras can be astonishingly
useful in capturing overhead imagery to give real estate marketing packages new
sparkle, to enable reporters and news photographers to jump cameras into the air
over a fire, a hostage situation, or a vehicle crash, to allow construction
contractors to program them to fly back and forth to monitor progress on a
construction site, to permit public safety personnel to fly a grid to search for a
fugitive or a missing person; to provide new tools to agricultural insurers to
check crop damage.
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) prefers to call them “small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems”—“sUAS”. Most everyone else calls them
“drones.” Whatever they are called, these new types of air vehicles portend a
revolution in aviation, making available the fruits of fifty years in research and
development in automatic control systems, semiconductor miniaturization,
composite fiber materials, and battery development in packages that cost less
than a high-end HD television.
A vexing problem that confronts adopters of any new technology is
matching the technology with the people who use it. Although engineers can
take the latest lab results in structures, miniaturized computing power, navigation
algorithms, and sensors and turn them into products that have traction in the
marketplace, they cannot engineer the people. Operators pretty much come as
they are. They can be trained, tested, and granted governmental licenses or
private certificates of competence, but the limits of their physical capacities and
mental processing agility is ingrown. Any good engineer pays close attention to
this and makes sure that her system design accommodates human limitations.
Managers know that they must embrace new technology at the right time,
neither taking on too much risk as early adopters, nor waiting so long that the

PERRITT_DROP_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

SUMMER 2015]

DEVELOPING DROP DISCIPLINE

5/3/2015 5:02 PM

145

competition gains an advantage. They struggle to figure out whether their
existing workforce can be retrained and redirected to use the new technologies,
or whether they must recruit new and more flexible talent. They choose between
recruiting the best raw talent and molding it or limiting their hiring to those that
already have proven their capacity. Is a licensing system in place? If so, what
level of licensing must the operator have? Is an undergraduate college or
graduate degree necessary? Can additional training be arranged by contracting
with specialized schools?
Sometimes—as is the case so far with microdrones—innovation struggles
against governmental restrictions premised, not on the features of the new
technology, but on risks presented by old technology. Now, the FAA has
crossed a bridge by responding to a statutory mandate to integrate microdrones
into the National Airspace System by 2014.1 On February 15, 2015, it issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”)2 that wisely rejected the idea of
subjecting microdrones to the burdens of traditional aircraft, pilot, and
operational requirements designed around the risks posed by airplanes and
helicopters. Instead it adopts performance standards for DRone OPerators
(“DROPs”), reinforced by a knowledge test tailored to what they need to know,
and a simple set of limitations that confine microdrone flight to the proximity of
the DROP. The NPRM recognizes that the FAA was fighting a losing battle to
prohibit commercial operation of microdrones, and that a mismatch between
regulatory requirements and reality would produce a market in which the
principal regulator of aviation safety is ignored.
The NPRM recognizes that microdrones do not fit the regulatory matrix
developed over the last century for airplanes and helicopters with people on
board. It has adopted an approach for matching the people with the technology.
It concludes that, while microdrones are much simpler to fly than airplanes and
helicopters because of their computerized controls systems, their DROPs
nevertheless need to understand the national airspace system, and the ways in
which manned aircraft maneuver through it. That leads to the knowledge test
requirement.3 The FAA wisely has molded the content of the DROP knowledge
test to the things DROPs need to know, as opposed to the things airplane and
helicopter pilots need to know to fly hundreds or thousands of miles in varying
weather, and to deal with emergencies like engine failures leading to glides or
autorotations.
While the knowledge test will be developed by the FAA itself and
administered through the existing network of private testing centers accredited
by the FAA, the NPRM leaves open the question of how DROP candidates will
prepare for the knowledge test and acquire the skills necessary to fly their
1.
2.

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 112 P.L. 95, 126 Stat. 11 §333 (2012).
FAA, OPERATION AND CERTIFICATION OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS;
PROPOSED RULE, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (Feb. 23, 2015) (hereinafter “NPRM”) (an NPRM is the first
formal step in promulgating federal rules that have the force of law).
3. See id. at 103-07 (discussing need for a knowledge test).
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microdrones safely. Implicitly, the NPRM recognizes that a rich array of
private-sector training, testing, and certification regimes can meet the needs of
the emerging microdrone community, while protecting the existing aviation
community and the general public from unsafe operation. DROPs do not need
traditional pilot’s licenses to operate safely, but they do need training on the
particular risks associated with microdrones, especially their automatic control
systems and wireless control links. The best way to deliver the training, test
training results, and certify competence is through a new infrastructure of private
associations working in conjunction with the FAA, linked to its DROP
knowledge test.
While this approach is tailored to new realities, it does not differ materially
from the long-standing governmental-private partnership that trains, tests, and
certifies airplane and helicopter pilots. It focuses the efforts on the problem to be
solved instead of trying to shoe-horn microdrones into a traditional framework
that does not fit.
This article begins, in section II, by describing the features of typical
microdrones, highlighting the main requirements of the NPRM, and
emphasizing the validity of the FAA’s rejection of calls to impose a requirement
that DROPs have a traditional pilot’s license—a requirement the FAA itself had
insisted upon in its grant of some 25 exemptions from its ban4 and that the Air
Line Pilots Association had urged be made even tougher.5
It probes the economic and political factors that will come to bear as the
FAA and others defend its appropriateness in the NPRM, in section III.
0The articles then moves, in section IV, to explain that compliance with
any regulatory regime depends on cultural factors that encourage compliance,
and argues that FAA regulation of microdrones will be far more effective if a
community of DROPs emerges resembling the long-standing community of
aviators. More than a testing requirement is necessary for that to happen.
Section V explains why the Delegation doctrine does not prevent an
administrative agency from giving a significant role to private sector actors in
implementing a mandatory regulator regime.
Section VI moves to explain the content of desirable requirements for
DROPs, beginning with the concept of validation—the need to relate selection
and certification requirements to specific competencies necessary to reduce risk.
It works through the major areas of knowledge identified in the NPRM and
explains why they are necessary, while also justifying the exclusion of other
skills and knowledge needed by airplane and helicopter pilots but not by
DROPS.

4. Petition for Exemption No. 11138 at 13-16, Douglas Trudeau, Realtor, No. FAA-20140481 (discussing requirement for private pilot’s license requirement and additional microdrone
training and experience, in grant of section 333 petition).
5. See id. at 9 (describing ALPA’s advocacy of a commercial pilot requirement, in grant of
section 333 petition).
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Finally, in section VII, it proposes one or more private associations that
would develop and deliver DROP skills training programs and certification,
prepare DROP candidates for the new knowledge test, and work with the FAA
to refine knowledge testing and other requirements for DROPs.
To be sure, the growing debate over regulating microdrones—one certain
to intensify during the comment period on the NPRM—is not limited to a debate
over DROP training and licensing requirements alone. It also involves
consideration of height, range, weight, and geographic limitations expressed in
operating rules, debate over what features should be required of onboard control
systems and their ability to operate autonomously to limit the risk of
irresponsible DROP decisions, and identification and data transmission
requirements to enhance collision avoidance and enforcement.6 To require a
$7,000 private pilot certificate,7 or as Airline Pilot’s Association (“ALPA”)
would prefer, a $40,000-$200,000 commercial certificate,8 to operate a $900
microdrone over one’s own farm or vacation home is a powerful impediment to
further deployment of this technology. It is important that the FAA resist such
proposals.

6. See NPRM, supra note 2, at 84 (discussing exclusion from Classes B, C, and D
airspace); id. at 124-30 (discussing registration and marketing requirements).
7. Pilot Certificate Options and Timeline, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.aopa.org/letsgoflying/ready/time/options.html (last visited on Mar. 20, 2015) (estimating
total cost of obtaining private pilot’s license as $5,000-$7,000; explaining requirements and
timelines).
8. The cost of commercial pilot certification varies widely, depending on whether the candidate
combines the requisite flight training with getting an undergraduate degree. It costs less, of course, to omit
the degree. Then the cost is on the order of $36,000, representing the sum of the cost of a private license
(say $7,000), the cost of further training for the commercial license (say another $8,000), and the cost of
flight time to accumulate the required 250 hours (210 hours at $100 per hour, to be added to the 40 hours
accumulated for the private license. See, e.g. Commercial Pilot Training - Accelerated Commercial Pilot
License - Flight Training Course (Single Engine, Initial), SUN STATE AVIATION, http://www.sun
stateaviation.com/commercial.html (estimating cost of commercial license as $4443 for private pilot with at
least 240 total time); Commercial Pilot Pricing, TOUCH-N-GOES AVIATION (last visited on Mar. 28, 2015)
(estimating http://www.touch-n-goes.com/commercial/commercialpilotpricing.html cost of commercial
license at $7,950 for holder of private license with 250 hours total time). Undergraduate programs combine
the cost of flight training with tuition. See, e.g. Tuition and Estimated Costs: Fall 2014 - Spring 2015,
EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, http://daytonabeach.erau.edu/ admissions/ estimated-costs/
(last visited on Mar. 28, 2015) (estimating tuition for degree program as $43,198 per year and flight-student
costs at an additional $81,000); Tuition and Fees, LEWIS UNIVERSITY, http://www.lewisu.edu/
welcome/offices/business/bursar/tuitionrates.htm (last visited on Mar. 28, 2015) (estimating degreeprogram tuition as $13,915 per semester); Aviation Flight Management, B.S., LEWIS UNIVERSITY,
http://www.lewisu.edu/academics/aviation/flight-management/ (last visited on Mar. 28, 2015) (plus $7,000
to $8,000 per semester for flight training). So the cost of a bachelor’s degree and multi-engine commercial
rating from Lewis University would be about $176,000.

PERRITT_DROP_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

148

5/3/2015 5:02 PM

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:2

This is the third in a series of articles about drones by the co-authors. The
first, Drones,9 introduces the subject and explores the technologies that makes
microdrones so useful and so inexpensive. It provides an overview of
technological, economic, political, and regulatory issues that the second article
and this one explore more deeply. The second article, Law Abiding Drones,10
argues that the character of microdrones justifies simplified regulation as
consumer products, with automated flight control and safety systems that make
flying them easy, compared with airplanes and helicopters. This article focuses
on the question of operator qualifications. It does not repeat the details of its
overview of microdrone potential, the subject of the Vanderbilt article, or the
analysis of microdrone control systems, the subject of the Columbia article. The
three articles complement a number of magazine articles written by the coauthors.11
II.
A.

The Current Market and Regulatory Regime

Microdrone Vehicles

The DJI Phantom12 and its more recently introduced, larger, sibling, the DJI
Inspire13 are archetypal microdrones. Both are quadcopters—vehicles that
produce thrust with four motors at the end of booms that drive rotors. The thrust
generated by each rotor is determined by varying the RPM of the motor. Unlike
helicopter rotor blades, the blades of the microdrone rotors have fixed pitch.

9. 17 VANDERBILT J. SC. & TECH. L. 101 (2015).
10. To be published in the COLUMBIA SCI. TECH. L. REV.
11. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VANDERBILT J. SC. & TECH. L.
101) (hereinafter “Perritt & Sprague”). See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Is there
a drone in your future?, HELIWEB 14 (May 2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague,
Drone Dread, ROTOR & WING MAGAZINE 34 (June 2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O.
Sprague, But Who’s Going to Fly Them? PROFESSIONAL PILOT 94 (June 2014); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law and Order in the Skies, THE TECH (MIT student newspaper) 13 (June
2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Leashing Drones, ROTORCRAFT PRO (July 2014);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, ROTOR & WING MAGAZINE (Sept.
2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law Abiding Drones: What to Tell
Clients that Want to Use Drones in Their Business, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Oct., 2014); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Ready for the Microdrone Races?, NEWSLETTER OF THE RADIO
TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASSOCIATION (Oct. 29, 2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O.
Sprague, Reigning in the Renegades, VERTICAL MAGAZINE (forthcoming Dec./Jan. 2014-2015);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, DOMESTICATING DRONES: THE TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND ECONOMICS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT (Ashgate Publishing, under contract for delivery Oct.
2015).
12. Phantom 2 Vision+, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-plus (last visited Mar.
24, 2015) (summarizing design and performance of DJI Phantom 2+).
13. Inspire 1, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015)
(summarizing design and performance of DJI Inspire).
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Onboard computers and electrical control circuits on a control board and
power distribution board determine how much electrical current should be
delivered to each motor to control its RPM—more current, more RPM. By
delivering different levels of current to the different motors, the control system
adjusts the attitude of the vehicle and permits it hover, climb, descend, fly
forward, backwards, or sideways.
Electrical power is delivered to the motors through the power distribution
board from an 11.1 V, 10,000 milliampere hour lithium polymer battery that has
sufficient capacity to power flights of 20 minutes to 30 minutes. The battery also
delivers electrical power to peripherals, such as a built-in two- or three-axis
camera gimbal and a camera. Different models of the Phantom are configured to
carry a GoPro camera or a built-in DJI camera with similar still photography and
full-motion video capture capability.
The Inspire has bigger motors, larger rotors, and thus can carry a greater
payload, up to and including the popular RED camera used for moviemaking. It
also has a larger and more sophisticated gimbal.
Basic microdrone
configurations like these can carry other types of sensors more useful for
surveying and also can carry small objects such as advertising banners.
The control board has GPS receiver and associated computer logic that
permit these microdrones to determine their position in space and to maintain it
or to fly a programmed pattern. The control board also has a magnetometer—an
electronic compass—a barometric altimeter that measures altitude, and, in the
case of the Inspire, a downward looking sonar sensor that provides more
accurate indications of height above the surface. Finally, the control boards have
an inertial measurement unit (“IMU”) comprising three accelerometers that
permit the drone to know its direction of movement and acceleration. The
combination of the IMU, the altimeters, and the magnetometer allow the drone
to know its position even when an adequate GPS signal is unavailable, although
GPS navigation is more accurate.
The vehicles have transceivers tuned to the 2.4 and 5.8 GHz bands that
receive control inputs from the DROP and send them to the control board and
transmit telemetry data with position, speed, altitude, direction of flight, and
battery power remaining, and stream the video captured by the camera.
The control board integrates DROP commands, data from its sensors, and a
geographic database similar to Google Maps. The control board is also
programmed to enable automatic hover when no control inputs are being
received and to return home autonomously in the event of a malfunction, such a
loss of control-link signal or impending battery exhaustion. The programs also
prevent the DROP from flying into controlled airspace or near airports, above a
certain height, and beyond a specified range. They also allow the DROP to
specify a flight path to be flown over the ground by tapping waypoints on a map
display.
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The DROP controls the vehicle by moving two joysticks and adjusting
switches on a small console (“DROPCON”) that can be worn on the strap
around his neck. A helicopter pilot flying the drone interprets the left joystick as
the collective, controlling thrust by upward and downward movement and the
right joystick as the cyclic, controlling pitch and roll and thereby direction of
flight. Yaw is controlled by moving the left joystick left and right.
The Inspire can accommodate two DROPCONS, one used by the DROP,
and the other used by a separate photographer who controls the camera and its
gimbal. Serious photography missions benefit from having two persons, the
DROP to fly the vehicle, and the photographer (“photog”) to concentrate on the
imagery being captured.
Each DROPCON has a transmitter to send the control signals to the
vehicle, receivers to acquire the downlink telemetry and video signal, and an
iPad-Mini-sized LED video display that allows the DROP (and a separate
photog) to see the imagery captured by the onboard camera.
Prices for the Phantom range from $700-$1200, depending on whether
the purchaser supplies her own camera.14 The price for the Inspire is just under
$3000. 15
Many competitive alternatives exist, of course, comparable in price and
performance to the Phantom and Inspire.16 Larger hexacopters and octocopters
are also available at prices ranging from under $10,000 to about $20,000.17
These bigger vehicles can carry considerably more payload and, in some cases,
have significantly greater endurance, up to an hour.18
B.

The FAA Ban and the NPRM

Before the NPRM was released, the FAA took the position that
commercial flight of drones is illegal unless one obtains an exemption from
FAR compliance under section 333 of the 2012 Act, registers the drones, and
also obtains a Civil Certificate of Authority (“COA”) for specific flight
programs.19 Presumably the ban remains in effect—at least in principle—until
14. Phantom 2 Vision+ V3.0, DJI, https://store.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-plus?position=1
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (quoting prices for various models of Phantom).
15. Inspire 1 & Accessories, DJI, https://store.dji.com/inspire-1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (quoting
price for Inspire 1).
16. IRIS+, 3D ROBOTICS INC., http://3drobotics.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
17. The CineStar H8L is an example. See CineStar 8, FREEFLY SYSTEMS, http://freeflysystems.com/
products/cinestar/8 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015)
18. Walkera QR X800 Pro Film Quadcopter, EPFILMS, http://epfilms.tv/walkera-qr-x800-reviewbest-aerial-filming/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (reviewing 8.6 pound multicopter claiming up to one hour
of endurance).
19. See, e.g., Section 333, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.faa.gov/uas/
legislative_programs/section_333/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (FAA guidance on seeking Section
333 expemptions for microdrones); Documents relating to Docket CP-217: Huerta v. Pirker,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Pages/pirker.aspx
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (reversing ALJ decision and reinstating FAA ban).
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the NPRM completes the comment process and emerges as a final rule. This,
however, is unlikely to occur until 2016 or early 2017.
The FAA does, however, have discretion as to when it commences
enforcement proceedings, discretion that it has used for years to leave model
aircrafts alone,20 even though their flight arguably requires compliance with all
the Federal Aviation Regulations’ (“FARs”) for airworthiness certification,
pilots’ licenses, and compliance with operating rules designed for airplanes and
helicopters.21 It would be good policy to exercise this discretion not to enforce
the theoretical ban against DROPs who fly in conformity with the NPRM
while it is being finalized. This would include obtaining certification from a
private association that they have passed a knowledge test based on the
NPRM’s proposal.
C.

The Private Pilot Requirement

In all of the 24 Section 333 exemptions granted as of early 2015, the
FAA consistently insisted on at least a private pilot’s license for DROPs.22
It rejected arguments from ALPA that a commercial pilot’s license should
be required,23 and also rejected proposals by some of the petitioners that
less should be required, such as completion of a manufacturer or operator
provided training program, or satisfactory completion of the private pilot
knowledge test without having to satisfy the flight proficiency requirement.24
There is every reason to expect that ALPA and others preferring high barriers
to entry for microdrones will urge the FAA to modify the NPRM to reinstate a
conventional pilot’s license requirement.
As the NPRM recognizes,25 requiring a private (or commercial) pilot’s
license is not an appropriate way to reduce risks associated with commercial
microdrone flight.
One thing we know for sure (and via the FAA’s own research)
Predator pilots with conventional licenses make more mistakes
than Army operators without a pilot’s license in flying their

20. NPRM, supra note 2, at 45-48 (discussing model aircraft regulation historically and under
proposed rule).
21. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21-121 (2010).
22
22. Drone Laws Blog, All FAA Grant of Exemptions Under Section 333, ANTONELLI LAW
http://dronelawsblog.com/faa-grant-exemptions-section-333/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015)
23. FAA, Grant of Exemption to Helinet Aviation Services, LLC, Exemption No. 11160,
FAA Docket No. 2014-0785 at 3-5 (Feb. 2, 2015) (discussing ALPA objections to petition).
24. Compare FAA, In the matter of Trimble Navigation Ltd., Exemption No. 11110, FAA Docket
No. 2014-0367 at 7 (grant of exemption Dec.10, 2014) (proposing no pilot-license requirement) with id. at
15 (imposing private-pilot requirement).
25. NPRM, supra note 2, at 99-107 (explaining why traditional pilot’s license should not
be required).
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UAVs,’ says Missy Cummins, who teaches courses about drones
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Duke University.
So making everyone get a license does nothing to improve safety.26
To evaluate that position, one needs to know what is necessary to get a
private pilot’s license.
An applicant for a private pilot’s license must complete at least 40
hours of flight time, including 20 hours of dual instruction27 from a
certificated flight instructor (“CFI”)28 and undergo an adequate amount of
ground instruction29 to permit him to pass both a written (“knowledge”) test
and a Check Ride— the “practical test.” The knowledge test is designed by
the FAA and administered by private test centers designated by the FAA.30
Check Rides are conducted by FAA inspectors or by designated pilot
examiners (“DPEs”)—CFIs specifically selected by the FAA to perform
these delegated roles.31 Candidates may not take the knowledge exam or
the practical test until they are endorsed for both by their flight instructor.32
Specific knowledge and skills requirements are considered in sections VI
and VII.A, which consider the relevance of these requirements for certification
of DROPs.
Costs for obtaining a private pilot’s license range from $6000—
$10,000,33 depending on the rate at which a candidate progresses. Instructors
usually teach through flight schools, which range from small one to fourperson operations to larger and more formal operations accredited by the FAA
under Part 141.34 Flight schools include aeronautical universities such as
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,35 Lewis University,36 and Hillsboro
Aero Academy. 37
26. Jonathan Berr, Why Amazon’s drone delivery service is a long way away, CBS NEWS (Dec. 9,
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-amazons-drone-delivery-service-is-a-long-ways-away/.
27. 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(a) (2010) (airplane); 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(c) (2010) (helicopter).
28. 14 C.F.R. § 61.193 (2009) (describing privileges of CFI). An “authorized instructor”
includes a CFI, and a ground instructor for ground training. 14 C.F.R. § 61.1(b) (2015) (defining
“authorized instructor”).
29. 14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a) (2013).
30. Pilot Testing, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.faa.gov/pilots/testing/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2015) (describing content of knowledge tests and knowledge test centers).
31. 14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE).
32. 14 C.F.R. § 61.35(a)(1) (2013) (requiring instructor endorsement of preparedness for
knowledge test).
33. See NPRM, supra note 2 (calculating cost of private pilot’s certificate); 14 C.F.R. §
61.39(a)(6) (2015) (requiring instructor endorsement of preparedness for practical test).
34. See 14 C.F.R. § 141 (2013) (FAA-approved flight schools).
35. EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, http://www.erau.edu/ (last visited Mar.
24, 2015).
36. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, B.S., LEWIS UNIVERSITY, http://www.lewisu.edu/academics/
unmanned-aircraft-systems/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
37. About Us, HILLSBORO AERO ACADEMY, http://www.flyhaa.com/en/page/school (last
visited Mar. 24, 2015).
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Economics and Politics

In a truly rational world, licensing would be tightly integrated with the
knowledge and skills required to perform the tasks of the occupation. That
would, as section VI.A explains, require ongoing validation analysis and
testing of the power of each licensing requirement to reduce one or more
discrete risks experienced in the operating environment. Stall-prevention and
recovery is practiced in flight training to reduce the obvious risks associated
with stalling and losing control of an airplane. Practice autorotation is part of
the helicopter training to ensure that rotor RPM does not decay so much
after an engine failure that the helicopter loses the capacity to generate lift.
Conversely, the FAA recognized, in early 2015, that knowledge testing on
automatic direction finding using ADF equipment makes little sense, because
few aircraft are equipped with ADF now, most ADF ground stations have been
phased out, and ADF has been replaced by newer technologies for navigation.38
That is not, however, how most licensing decisions in a market-oriented
economy and democratic political system are made. Rather, new licensing
requirements are imposed by legislatures and administrative agencies based on
a combination of experience-based instincts, mass political reaction to highly
publicized mishaps, and efforts by existing occupants of the field to limit
competition.
The likelihood of a close coupling between training and licensing
requirements and operational reality is increased when practitioners are involved
in defining and administering the requirements. In that respect, it is worth
noting that almost everyone who participates in the flight training process for
would-be pilots is himself a pilot, as often as not one involved in flying for a
living in operations beyond flight training. Similarly, substantial fractions of
the faculty in medical schools are comprised of practicing physicians. Law
schools are much criticized, on the other hand, because of the relatively thin
involvement of legal practitioners in determining the content of legal
education, which is mostly designed by full-time, research-oriented, academics,
who have left the practice behind—or who never had practice experience.
Involvement from active practitioners in setting and enforcing licensing
standards, however, increases the likelihood of industry capture. Industry
capture distorts the content of licensing requirements by simply making them
the highest possible barriers to entry. The literature on occupational licensing
suggests a variety of approaches to mitigate the risk of turning licensing
regimes into cartels, but the best approach across the board is to insist that the
38. Dan Namowitz, Goodbye NDB and other outdated test questions, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND
PILOTS ASSOCIATION (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/January/
29/FAA-posts-positive-airman-testing-changes-on-web-site (discussing removal of ADF questions
from knowledge test).
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proponents or defenders of licensing regimes and their training components
demonstrate the validity of each basic requirement, in terms of its relationship
to an operational risk. The analytical process is not unlike that imposed under
Title VII on employer testing and job requirements.
There is little evidence of large-scale anticompetitive behavior in the
aviation labor market yet.39 To be sure, collective-bargaining agreements
for pilots protect the job security and compensation arrangements for existing
pilots from competitive pressures from new entrants. It is true that the
1500 hour requirement and the toughening of ATP knowledge testing
ratchets up the barriers to entry by new pilots, but the evidence that existing
pilot organizations pushed for these changes is thin.
In any event, advocacy of toughened requirements for pilot qualification
almost always can be justified, as in so many other fields, by the enhanced
safety that will result from the tougher requirements. Pilot groups such as the
ALPA40 and the agricultural pilots association have been advocating that
microdrones be operated only by persons possessing traditional pilots
licenses.41 They justify their position based on arguments that requiring a
pilot’s license will enhance safety of microdrone flight.42 It is also true,
however, that the more demanding the requirements for microdrone operation
are, the less of a threat they present to established manned aircraft operations
and pilot jobs. The purpose of the advocacy may or may not be
anticompetitive, but the effect certainly is. The balance between genuine
safety concerns and anticompetitive efforts can be evaluated by the rigor with
which the advocates of DROP licensing link specific licensing requirements to
specific microdrone flight risks. The groups have not done much of that yet.
Furthermore, the credibility of a concern that more drones mean fewer
airline pilot jobs or fewer helicopter charters is low. The putative
anticompetitive instinct would come more from a loose sense of association
with the pilot community in general, and a concern that, somewhere, in
some part of the industry, drones might result in less demand for manned
aircraft and therefore pilots.
39. But see Jack Nicas, Man vs Drone: Some Pilots Fight Back Against Robots, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
15, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/man-vs-drone-some-pilots-fight-back-against-robots-1421347663
(quoting pilots who fear commercial competition from microdrones and sought private-pilot requirement
in order to limit competition).
40. Federal Aviation Administration. Exemption No. 11160, Docket No. FAA-2014-0785
(Feb. 2, 2015) at 4 (FAA letter describing ALPA position that a commercial pilot certificate
should be required).
41. Id. at 5 (describing NAAA opposition to petition).
42. Id. at 4 (quoting NAAA opposition to petition commenting that, “Just as manned aircraft pilots
are required to undergo a rigorous training curriculum and show that they are fit to operate a commercial
aircraft, so too must UAS operators. Holding a commercial certificate holds UAS operators to similar high
standards as commercial aircraft operators and ensures they are aware of their responsibilities as
commercial operators within the NAS. Medical requirements ensure they have the necessary visual and
mental acuity to operate a commercial aircraft repeatedly over a sustained period of time.”)
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The alarmist argument, regularly advanced by ALPA, that a
microdrone strike could bring down a 747 is nonsense. In order to be
certified by the FAA, turbine engines for air transport aircraft must satisfy
bird-ingestion tests.43 The engines for the 747 and 787 must withstand
ingestion of an eight-pound bird.44 A DJI Phantom weighs 2.6 pounds, and
a DJI Inspire weighs 6.4 pounds.45 The Cinestar 8HL weighs 6.72
pounds.46
Moreover, most bird strikes are not catastrophic to engine operation:
“By far, most bird encounters do not affect the safe outcome of a
flight. In more than half of the bird ingestions into engines, the flight crew
is not even aware that the ingestion took place.”47
Their incidence suggests that microdrone/manned-aircraft collisions
would be unlikely:
The extreme rarity of any collisions between birds and aircraft
away from airports and at low altitude, despite the population
of 10 billion birds, suggests that unintentional impact between
UAVs and manned aircraft away from airports and low
altitude will always remain extremely unlikely.48
IV.

Dynamics of Compliance

Governments may adopt rules, but that does not necessarily alter
behavior. Prohibition and the war against drugs—particularly as it concerns
recreational marijuana use—come to mind. Whether the targets of the rules
comply with them depends on how well the rules fit the economic
43. 14 C.F.R. § 33.76(b) (2007) (requiring test with “large single bird” aimed at the most critical
exposed location on the first stage rotor blades at a bird speed of 200 knots; requiring bird weights of 48 pounds, depending on engine inlet throat area). See also FAA Advisory Circular: Bird Ingestion
Certification Standards, AC No. 33.76-1A (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/
Advisory_ Circular/AC%2033.76-1A.pdf.
44. The GEnx engine used for the Boeing 787 and the 747-8 has a fan diameter of 111
inches for the 787 and 105 inches for the 747-8. This produces an engine inlet throat area of
9676.88 square inches for the 787 and 8364.67 square inches for the 747-8. An eight-pound bird
is required to certify these engines. 14 C.F.R. § 33.76 (2007), Table 1 (requiring tests with bird
weight 8.03 pounds for engine inlet throat area greater than 6,045 square inches).
45
45. See Phantom 2 Vision+ Specs, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-plus/spec (last
visited Mar. 24, 2015) and Inspire 1 Specs, DJI http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1/spec (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015).
46
46. See CineStar-8 MK Heavy Lift RTF, QUDROCOPTER http://www.quadrocopter.com/CineStar8-MK-Heavy- Lift-RTF_p_1156.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2015)
47. Airplane Turbofan Engine Operation and Malfunctions Basic Familiarization for
Flight Crews, Federal Aviation Administration, 23, https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_
approvals/engine_prop/media/engine_malf_famil.doc.
48. UAS Safety Analysis, EXPONENT 7 (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.uasamericafund.com/
assets/micro-uav-safety-analysis.pdf (hereinafter “MIT Bird Study”).
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circumstances of the targets, on whether informal behavioral norms of relevant
groups encourage or discourage compliance, on the level of sanctions for
noncompliance, and on the resources available to detect and punish
noncompliance.49 If, as many people believe,50 drone operation should be
regulated, and only persons with the requisite skills and safety orientation
should be allowed to fly them, regulatory designers must pay attention to the
logical relationship between rule content and verifiable risks. They also must
understand the extralegal forces that can encourage compliance and work to
mobilize those forces.
In many areas of human activity, actors adhere to norms that are not
codified in law. Aviation is a prominent example.51 Going to the back of the
line in a grocery store or an airport boarding area are examples within almost
everyone’s experience. In other cases, these informal behavioral patterns have
been translated into legal rules. In still other cases, a combination of legal
mandates and prohibitions and private networks that encourage compliance and
actually enforce them have grown up together. Aviation regulation, qualification
of lawyers, physicians, and accountants are prominent examples of interrelated
governmental and private forces. There are many other, examples as well.
Although economists identify a number of reasons why large groups
are incapable of self-governance without intervention by legal obligation,52
small groups, many quite informal, regularly govern themselves. “Most
social order is not created by the State. There exists a vast ocean of social
rules completely untouched by formal law.”53
Sociology teaches that repeated interaction stimulates the creation and
enforcement of social norms and compliance with them.54 Governments may
help create the preconditions by “yoking actors together into relationships of
49. See infra, note 53.
50. Ipsos Poll Conducted for Reuters, IPSOS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.ipsos-na.com/
download/pr.aspx?id=14209 (reporting 42% oppose private ownership of drones).
51. See, e.g. Geoff Goodyear, Focus on Safety: Experience Acquired at the Speed of Light,
VERTICAL MAGAZINE, Feb/Mar. 2015 (reviewing basic safety practices); Pilots Resources: Air Safety
Institute, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, http://www.aopa.org/Pilot-Resources/AirSafety-Institute (describing safety resources available to pilots through pilots’ organization).
52. See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
53. Bryan H. Druzin, Planting Seeds of Order: How the State Can Create, Shape, and Use
Customary Law, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 375 (2014) [hereinafter Druzin]. See also Lawrence
Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Ryan Goodman, Beyond the
Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CALIF. L. REV.
643, 643 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349
(1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 346-47 (1997).
54. Druzin, supra 52, at 377-378.
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repeated interaction through establishing legal obligations between them that
will ensure this repetition.”55 Bryan Druzin offers the hypothetical example of
the laws requiring the members of a small group to help one of their members
prepare daily meals.56 The resulting interaction will give rise to various
informal rules guiding participation and sanctions for shirking.57 He also
offers as an example the emergence of the medieval Law Merchant, a series of
customs that governed commercial interaction in business communities before
commercial law emerged.58 The state encourages such private arrangements
simply by making private contracts enforceable through state institutions.59 He
offers some practical examples of how the state could engineer private
governance:
If the State considered it in the public interest that everyone take
better care of their front yards, rather than concocting intricate
laws requiring people to do so (something that would require
unrealistic levels of monitoring and enforcement), the State could
adopt the more deft approach of customary law cultivation. The
State could harness the self-ordering potential of repeated
interaction by requiring, for example, that the residents of a street
collectively tend to one of the yards on the street each Sunday
(the yard to be tended would change each week to ensure
reciprocity). Non-compliance would be subject to a small fine.
Instead of fabricating and enforcing a complex system of
regulation, the State could simply impose a single legal
obligation yet one that deliberately comprises an ongoing
positive duty so as to bring private parties together into
relationships of repeated interaction.60
In support of this hypothetical arrangement, he offers the example of
“barn raising” in some rural communities: a phenomenon in which members of
the community came together to help one member build a barn, supported by
the expectation that the beneficiary would reciprocate.61
In the context of DROP certification, the FAA could play a similar
role. The NPRM’s testing requirement encourages a would-be DROP to be
a member of an association similar to the American Association of Drone
Instructors (“AADI”)62 and to obtain certification through the association.

56

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. 388-390.
Id. at 390.
Druzin, supra 52, at 392.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 399.
See § C (describing proposed association of drone instructors).
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Delegation

The idea of a private association working with the FAA to implement
the NPRM does not involve handing off governmental authority to private
actors.
Democratic political theory and the pragmatism of the administrative
state collide when elected legislatures cede too much of their power to
unelected administrative agencies or to private entities. The anti-delegation
doctrine, rooted in the United States Constitution’s separation of powers
imposes limits on delegation of power by the United States Congress. In
Panama Refining Company63 and Schechter Poultry,64 the United States
Supreme Court struck down significant features of the National Industrial
Recovery Act.65 Congress had given up too much of its legislative power,
the court said, by delegating rulemaking authority to a combination the
National Recovery Administration, a federal agency, and private industry
groups.66 The particular action challenged in the Schechter litigation was
the adoption, as a mandatory federal fair-competition-code, of live poultry
codes developed by an industry association, which also was given
administration and criminal enforcement responsibility.67 Giving legislative
power to private citizens and entities provided even less political accountability
than giving it to agencies with an executive branch, the court reasoned.68
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so
as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and
beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or
industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be
constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such
associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their
enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such
a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in
section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of
legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.69
63. Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating, as overbroad,
delegation of power to President to prohibit interstate transportation of “hot oil”—oil produced in
excess of state quotas).
64. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
65. Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196.
66
65.
See Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
67. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 524-526 (describing code, its origin, and the
indictment of the challenger for violating it).
68
67. Id. at 537.
69. Id.
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Although some commentators viewed the delegation doctrine as
essentially obsolete,70 the Supreme Court regularly used it to scrutinize
statutory empowerment of administrative agencies.71 As recently as 2013, the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit used the delegation
doctrine to invalidate a statute empowering Amtrak—a private, albeit
government chartered—corporation to set performance standards for railroads,
in conjunction with Department of Transportation:72
“Federal lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private
entity. To do so would be legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.”73
Accordingly, the force of the delegation doctrine is not so much that it
regularly results in judicial invalidation of regulatory schemes as that it
influences the design of such schemes, as legislation is being written. Apart
from the responsibility of Congress, as well as the other two branches to honor
the Constitution, there is no point in enacting legislation that will be struck
down as unconstitutional.
But withstanding the delegation doctrine, Congress regularly gives
substantial rulemaking authority to agencies, sometimes mandating that agencies
adopt as governmental rules standards of conduct and performance developed
initially by private bodies such as standard-setting organizations.74 This is
constitutional, so long as Congress “channels” agency rulemaking power by
sufficiently specific criteria to limit its exercise. The legislative standards must
be sufficiently specific to permit Article III courts to ascertain whether the
agency has stayed within its delegated powers.75

70. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)(observing
that statutes have been invalidated under delegation doctrine only twice in U.S. history).
71. See Mistretta (upholding statute establishing federal Sentencing Commission);
Whitman v American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (recognizing viability of
delegation doctrine but rejecting delegation-doctrine challenge to EPA authority to set pollution
limits).
72. See Association of American Railroads v. United States Department of Transportation,
721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (declaring statute unconstitutional), rev’d, Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015) (remanding for
determination of whether delegation doctrine permitted Amtrak to participate in setting standards
for passenger train performance).
73. Ass’n of American Railroads, 721 F.3d at 670 (internal quotations omitted).
74. Updating OSHA Standards Based on National Consensus Standards; Head Protection, 77
Fed. Reg. 121 (Dep’t of Labor June 22, 2012) (proposed rules) available at https://www.osha.gov/
pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_id=23039 (showing
national consensus standards incorporated into OSHA regulations through a table).
75. American Ass’n of Railroads, 721 F.3d at 670 (observing that delegation to
administrative agency can survive delegation-doctrine challenge if an “intelligible principle” in
the statute constrains agency legislative power).
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Governmental rules derived from private sector standards of behavior are
quite common. Even more common are rules developed based largely or entirely
on private industry recommendations delivered through formal advisory
committees or otherwise.76 Indeed, the FAA traditionally has used such a process
for developing most of its rules for airworthiness certification, operating rules, and
pilot licensing.77
The FAA also relies on private individuals to implement and enforce its
rules. Most of the detailed testing and inspection of an aircraft as part of the
airworthiness certification process is performed, not by government employees,
but by private manufacturers applying accredited processes.78 Most flight tests
for pilot’s licenses are conducted, not by government employees, but by
Designated Pilot Examiners (“DPEs”).79 Virtually all medical examinations for
pilot certification are conducted by private physicians.80 Many control towers at
smaller airports are staffed, not by federally employed air traffic controllers, but
by private contractors performing the same functions.81
These arrangements that involve broad delegation of rulemaking and
rule-enforcement power by Congress initially to the FAA, and then to
private sector decision-makers are widely accepted. It is difficult to find
any argument that such an arrangement violates the delegation doctrine.82
There is no reason that mixed public/private mechanisms for drone
regulation would be any more vulnerable to constitutional scrutiny.
But the realities of the microdrone marketplace and the context within
which thousands of air vehicles will operate militate toward an even greater
reliance on private entities for developing regulations and training of DROPs.
The delegation doctrine may achieve increased prominence in shaping
regulatory alternatives.

76. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (FACA) MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW, G.S.A.
http://www.gsa.gov/ portal/content/104514. (last updated Apr. 20, 2015)
77. ADVISORY AND RULEMAKING COMMITTEES, FAA (2015) available at http://www.faa.gov
/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/. (“We develop regulations using committees that
include members of the aviation community and the FAA”).
78. Production Certificate Application and Approval Process, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Aug. 6, 2014,
2:01 pm). http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/production_approvals/prod_cert/prod_approv_proc/(describing
FAA approval and audit of manufacturer processes).
79. 14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE).
80. 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.405, 67.407 (2008) (describing examining physicians)
81. See U.S. Contract Tower Ass’n., (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) http://www.contracttower.org/
(describing contract-tower program).
82. A Westlaw search on February 3, 2015 by co-author Perritt with the search term
“delegation doctrine FAA private” produced no hits.
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Already, the FAA has made suggestions83 that recreational and hobbyist
flight should be governed as a matter of law by model airplane association
guidelines.84 Under such suggestions, the private organization not only would
develop the rules; they would enforce them by its membership expulsion power
and a governmental regulatory probation against microdrone flight unless by one
who is a member of the organization.85
That is not what the NPRM envisions; rather under it, the FAA retains the
authority to make the rules and to prescribe the content of DROP tests. This
follows the agency’s longstanding practice for pilot certification. The FARs
prescribe certain subjects that must be covered by flight training programs,86 but
the flight training programs themselves, stage testing, and certification of
readiness for certain steps in the certification process, such as taking a
knowledge test87 or taking a practical test (checkride)88 are done by private CFIs.
We have no particular objection to it, but it’s stylistically odd. The details of the
curriculum flow from the FAA practical test standards, but are fleshed out by
private flight schools, only some of which, under Part 141, are accredited by the
FAA,89 requiring their training materials, including instructional syllabi, to be
approved in advance by the FAA.90 The proliferation of microdrones
necessitates a decentralized approach that relies more on private entities. For
example, the law-abiding drone approach recommended by the authors of this
article,91 would, in some implementations, vest microdrone vendors with the
responsibility of designing training programs and certifying satisfactory
completion by DROPs.

83. Fed. Aviation Admin., Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, Docket No.
FAA-2014-0396 (June 18, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/model_aircraft_spec_rule.pdf at 11-12
(explaining requirement that model aircraft be operated within guidelines established by national
community model aircraft associations).
84. The model aircraft community has vociferously opposed the guidance. See AMA’s Response
to the FAA Interpretative Rule, ACADMEY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS (last visited Mar. 24, 2015)
http://www.modelaircraft.org /aboutama/ AMAInterpretiveRuleResponse.aspx .
85. See Membership Manual 2015, Article V, ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015) http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/memanual.pdf (providing for expulsion of member for
violating association rules).
86. 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(c) (2010) (specifying subjects of instruction).
87. 14 C.F.R. § 61.35(a)(1) (2013) (CFI endorsement for knowledge test).
88. 14 C.F.R. § 61.39(a)(6) (2013) (CFI endorsement for practical test).
89. 14 C.F.R. § 141.5 (2010) (requirements for approval).
90. 14 C.F.R. § 141.55(a)-(e) (2011) (requirements for approval of materials).
91. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law Abiding Drones: What to Tell
Clients that Want to Use Drones in Their Business, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, Oct., 2014 at 2;
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Reining in the Renegades, VERTICAL MAGAZINE
(Dec./Jan. 2014-2015).
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Content of Requirements

The NPRM sets forth the elements of knowledge that would be tested
before one could be certified as a DROP. Those are summarized in section
VII.A.1. Evaluating the content of these requirements should proceed from the
need to assess the nexus between any training and certification requirements
and the risks they are intended to mitigate—a process known to psychologists
as “validation.”92
The following section explains the validation concept and then applies it
to the set of knowledge and skills that DROPs should possess, compared to the
set of knowledge and skills needed by pilots of airplanes and helicopters.
In the NPRM the FAA embraced the idea of this kind of validation
analysis:
The NPRM refers to a pre-NPRM petition submitted by the UAS
America Fund that allows operation of microdrones weighing less than three
pounds without requiring a conventional pilot’s license.93 The petition is the
first of a series planned by the UAS America Fund advocating a segmented
approach, based on aircraft size.94 The NPRM invites comment on the
segmented approach.95
The NPRM aligns the FAA with the UAV America Fund’s position that
existing private or commercial licenses are not the appropriate mechanism for
assuring DROP qualification:96
[T]he private pilot and commercial pilot certificates currently
available involve substantial expense and hours of time learning
actual flying skills within a passenger aircraft cockpit, but those
skills do not have relevance to UAS operations, particularly for
the micro UA category. Micro UA are operated from the ground,
looking up. Skills learned inside an aircraft cockpit including
those for in-flight maneuvers, aircraft systems, emergency
procedures, and navigation are of minimal utility but impose
significant burdens. The financial burden associated with micro
UA pilots obtaining and maintaining a private pilot or
commercial license would significantly impact business
operations and will drastically reduce profits expected when
forming a business, with no measurable benefit. There also will
be a substantial burden on the FAA in issuing and maintaining
pilot records for UA operators who will never fly a manned
aircraft.97
92

91.
Test Validity, WIKIPEDIA, (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).
93. Petition of UAS American Fund, LLC to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to Implement
Operational Requirements for Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Docket No. FAA-2014-10870001 at 7-8 (filed Dec. 18, 2014) (petitioning for direct rulemaking rather than NPRM).
94. Id. at 4.
95. NPRM, supra note 2, at 52-54 (reporting earlier consideration of segmented approach
and inviting comment).
96. Id. at 11-13.
97. Id. at pp.13-14.
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Defining the knowledge and skills a DROP needs to fly a microdrone
safely is but a specific instance of a more general challenge: understanding the
implications of human/machine interaction as machines grow more intelligent
and agile. Specifying necessary knowledge and physical motor skills is quite
different for one operating a conventional bulldozer or construction crane,
compared with the requirements for safe operation of an assembly line robot.
Similarly, the skills necessary to make mathematical calculations on a slide
rule are quite different from those required to operate a sophisticated electronic
calculator or to use mathematics application software. The important
judgment required to operate microdrones are quite different from those
necessary to operate an airplane or helicopter, although the overlap increases as
automation intensifies. The old emphasis on motor memory is marginalized
by a new need how to use computer interfaces and how to deal with computer
malfunctions.
The training and testing content requirements developed in the section
can be imposed by regulation at the federal or state level; they can become
an outline for detailed syllabi developed by flight schools; and they can
form the core private certification as discussed in section VII.C.
A.

Validation

The FAA has committed itself to risk-based analysis.98 The NPRM
reiterates that commitment and delivers on it. Risk-based regulation requires
validation of regulatory requirements, establishing a nexus between each
requirement and the risks it is intended to reduce.
Validation of occupational requirements is common in other fields.
For example, the validation approach has called into question physical
strength and agility requirements for public safety officers.99
For instance, two federal courts have relied on the following
‘expert’ view of the differences between men’s and women’s
physical abilities to justify sex-segregated physical activity for
males and females:
[M]en are taller than women; stronger than women by
reason of their greater muscle mass; have larger hearts
than women and a deeper breathing capacity, enabling
them to utilize oxygen more efficiently than women;

98. NPRM, supra note 2, at 34 (characterizing approach as “data-driven, risk-based”).
99. See Ruth Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for Traditionally
Male Occupations as Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761
(1986).
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run faster, based upon the construction of the pelvic area,
which, when women reach puberty, widens, causing the
femur to bend outward, rendering the female incapable of
running as efficiently as a male.
Not only do courts exaggerate the differences between men and
women, implying for instance that no woman could run as fast as
any man, but they consider only those physical traits traditionally
valued by men. Yet, as commentator Lyn Lemaire noted, ‘the
importance of brute strength in many athletic activities is
overrated. . . .’ As this Article will explore, the emphasis on
male physical traits prevails in the selection of firefighters and
police officers.100
Ruth Colker urged greater scrutiny of actual job requirements rather
than assumptions based on stereotypes.101
In Harless,102 the Sixth Circuit recognized that a valid job analysis for
a physical abilities test must focus on the physical demands of the job. The
court found that the Toledo Police Department had never conducted a job
analysis to determine the amount of physical strength or extent of physical
exertion required for the job; instead, as the court found, the sole
justification for the examination was the wholly inadequate ‘intuition’ of
department officials.103
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,104 the Supreme Court held tests
administered by employers as part of the hiring process must be linked to
the ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs.105 The authoritative
guidance on validation in the employment context is the EEOC’s Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.106
Insisting on validation has utility outside the purely physical context.
A Harvard law professor, writing in 1982,107 proposed applying it to
selection of law firm associates. She reviewed the traditional emphasis on
law school pedigree and law school grades and the traditional justification
that these criteria predict future performance as a lawyer.108 She argued
that these are poor predictors:

100. Colker, supra note 98, at 771.
101. Colker, supra note 98, at 788-795 (citing Berkman, 536 F. Supp. at 204).
102. 619 F.2d at 611 (1980).
103
102. Id.
104. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
105. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 426-427.
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1978) (describing criterion-related validity study, content validity
studies, and construct validity study).
107. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV.
945 (1982).
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High grades and attendance at prestigious law schools are, at
best, imperfect predictors of performance as a lawyer. Grades,
for example, are designed to measure abilities that constitute a
very small segment of the range of abilities involved in effective
lawyering. Alternative selection schemes might measure
additional attributes of at least equal importance. The firm
might, for example, develop an assessment system that gave far
less weight to law school examinations and more to performance
on long-term written projects, trial and appellate advocacy skills,
ability to work well with colleagues on cooperative projects, and
qualities of aggressiveness, energy, and dedication to work.109
Pilot certification requirements enjoy a measure of validation absent from
most other occupational licensing. The National Transportation Safety Board
(“NTSB”) investigates accidents and writes detailed reports on the serious
ones. Its accident reports usually contain recommendations directed to
operators and often to the FAA. In its report on the Colgan Airways crash near
Buffalo,110 for example, the Board made 25 new recommendations for changes
to FAA operating rules, pilot training rules, and aircraft certification rules.111
The Congress legislated a response,112 requiring the FAA to implement NTSB
recommendations regarding flight crewmember training.113 It mandated new
FAA rules that, among other things radically toughened the requirements for
Airline Transport Pilot certificates,114 specifically including a total of 1,500
flight hours.115 The FAA responded with new rules.116
Furthermore, the credentials pilot employers insist that applicants for pilot
positions produce certificates and logbooks. Pilot logbooks show experience
in performing flight tasks; not grades on flight-school tests. Law firms do not
routinely insist on the equivalent of logbooks for law graduates applying for
associate jobs such as a log demonstrating how many cases the applicant has
litigated or how many new business entities the applicant has set up.

108. Id. at 1024.
109. Id.
110. NTSB, Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Feb. 12, 2009, NTSB/AAR10/01, http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1001.pdf (hereinafter
“Colgan Air Report”).
111. Colgan Air Report, supra note 109, at 156-159.
112. Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Public Law
111-216, 124 Stat. 2348
113. Id. at § 208.
114. Id. at § 217.
115. Id. at § 217(c).
116. 78 FED.REG. 66261.
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Also, pilot hiring decisions are generally based on flying with the
candidate. In these pre-hire flights, the operator evaluates a number of pilot
skills and attributes only some of which are part of formal pre-license training
and evaluation requirements. Similarly, law firms, especially through summer
clerkship programs, evaluate candidate attributes that are not part of law-school
curriculum or tested on the bar exam.
The validation question is to what degree these hiring criteria can be
exported backwards into formal requirements for training and testing.
The point is not that courts routinely should insist upon Title-VII level
validation analyses; the point is that the validation concept should inform
policy judgments about rule content for microdrone operation. It also may
be appropriate, if the policy process goes awry in this regard, if drone
operators were required to have traditional pilot’s licenses, for example, for
lack of validity justification to signify irrationality and arbitrary-andcapricious decision-making, obligating a reviewing court to invalidate such
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act.117 The literature
suggests that courts hearing challenges to the anticompetitive effect of
license requirements insist on objective empirical evidence that the content
of the certification requirements, as applied, actually provides net consumer
benefits.118
B.

Knowledge

The knowledge elements included in the testing required by the
NPRM for DROP certification119 honor the validation approach. Requiring
a manned aircraft pilot’s license does not; some of the requirements
overlap, but too many diverge.
1.

Principles of Flight

Microdrone DROPs should understand certain basic principles of physics,
including the idea that acceleration depends on the net force applied to an
object divided by its mass, that kinetic energy is one-half times mass times
velocity squared, and that in collisions or crashes, kinetic energy must be
absorbed by deformation of materials, including human body parts.
DROPs need only limited knowledge of aerodynamics, structures, and aircraft
stability and control. They should understand: the basics of lift and drag, how
lift is generated by rotors, how multirotor drones introduce pitch, role, and yaw
forces by varying thrust asymmetrically, and how thrust varies with RPM.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
118. David A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions are Just “Cartels By Another Name”
What Should we do About it?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 101 at 118.
119. See section 1.
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They also need to understand the basic functional components of a
microdrone control system: how the DROPCON transmits DROP control
inputs through the control link, how the receiver on the drones receives them
and feeds them into the computer logic of the control board which combines
them with inputs from the onboard GPS receiver, accelerometers,
magnetometer, and altimeter and translates them into signals that the power
distribution board can use to meter electrical current to each motor.
They should understand the basics of wind, not so much how it is
produced by meteorological forces, but the fact that airborne aircraft move
with the wind without experiencing crosswind, headwind, or tailwind.
Crosswinds, headwinds, and tailwinds exist only with reference to the ground.
In this context, they should understand and be able to compute wind
limitations based on arithmetic computation of the microdrone’s maximum
speed capability, compared with the wind components. In other words, a drone
that is capable only of achieving 20 knots will not be able to maintain its position
over the ground when the wind is blowing from any direction at 25 knots.
They also should understand the rudiments of autorotation by a variable
pitch rotor, so that they understand why a fixed pitch multirotor microdrone is
incapable of autorotation. Unlike a helicopter pilot, a DROP can do nothing to
set up an autorotation if the propulsion system fails. After a power failure, not
only will the drone’s rotors stop generating lift, causing the drone to fall at its
terminal velocity; it is likely to tumble because its rotors no longer produce the
stabilization forces to maintain its orientation.
DROPs should understand the basics of lithium polymer battery
chemistry, so that they can anticipate when battery capacity is likely to be
exhausted, and the risks associated with mishandling batteries.
Unlike airplane pilots, microdrone DROPs do not need to know the details
of airplane performance, stability and control, such as the relationship between
angle of attack and stalls, the dynamics of spins, how control surfaces work by
changing the camber of an airfoil, or how to calculate weight and balance. They
do not need to know the effect of density altitude on aircraft performance.
Unlike helicopter pilots, they do not need to understand effective translational
lift, translating tendency, loss of tail rotor effectiveness and the need for antitorque control.
2.

FARs, with an Emphasis on Airspace Classification

Unlike airplanes and helicopters, microdrones operate in confined local
spaces, generally less than 500 feet above the ground, and within the line of
sight of the DROP not more than about a thousand feet away. Apart from
safety guidelines, their performance will not allow them to do much more than
that; even though some microdrones are capable of flying much higher,
limitations on control-link range apply to the vertical dimension as well as a
horizontal one, which also limits height.
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DROPs, unlike pilots, do not need to master the many parts of the FARs
that pertain to long-distance flight. Nor, since line of sight cannot be maintained
in instrument meterological conditions (“IMC”), do they need to know those
parts of the FARs that pertain to instrument flight rule (“IFR”) operations.120
They do, however, need to know preflight and flight planning requirements
pertinent to a particular operation. Essentially, there needs to be an
understanding of obligations to make sure that the aircraft is in flying condition
before launch, how to select an operating area that minimizes risk, and the flight
techniques for safe operation within that area. They must appreciate the need not
to overfly people, and how they usually can get the imagery they want of people,
animals, and objects by positioning the drone at an offset angle of about 45°
rather than flying directly overhead. They also need to know how airspace is
defined and the limitations associated with different classes of airspace around
busier airports, including radio communication requirements. Finally, they
should know what to expect of manned aircraft, including the different height
limitations imposed on airplanes and helicopters, and typical approach and
departure flight profiles for both types of aircraft.
3. Radio Communication
Because safe operation of drones depends on the integrity and security of
the radio frequency (“RF”) links that connect drone with DROP, DROPs
should have a basic understanding of how RF communication works. In
particular, they should understand modulation, signal propagation, encryption,
and video encoding.
i.

Modulation in General

Communicating information by radio requires that the information be
superimposed on a carrier signal at the higher frequencies that permit it to be
propagated through space. The signal containing the information, whether a
series of bytes representing control inputs from the DROP to the drone, or video
transmitted back from the drone to the DROP or an associated photographer,
varies at a much lower frequency than is necessary for the carrier signal.
Superimposition of the lower frequency information on the carrier signal is called
modulation.121
A carrier signal can be modulated by adjusting its amplitude
(strength), shifting its frequency slightly, shifting its phase, or a
combination of all three. Current modulation techniques use a combination
to get the highest possible efficiency and noise immunity. But simpler
techniques better illustrate the process. The simplest of all, and therefore
the first to become a commercial reality is the superimposition of a Morse
code signal on a carrier, resulting in radiotelegraphy. In this form of
modulation, the carrier amplitude is modified by the Morse code signal.
120. 14 C.F.R. § 91.167-91.193.
121. See generally Modulation, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Modulation.
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Morse code represents alphanumeric characters and basic punctuation
marks by a series of dots and dashes.122 A “P” for example, is represented
by the pattern dot-dash-dash-got.123 To modulate a carrier so that the P is
transmitted involves adjusting amplitude crudely, between zero and
maximum. Thus transmitting a P involves turning the signal on briefly for
the dot, turning it off, turning it on for a somewhat longer period to
represent the first dash, turning it off, and then on again for the same period
to represent the second dash, turning it off, and then turning it on again
briefly for the final dot. Frequency shift keying, developed somewhat later,
provide better noise immunity. It involves shifting the carrier frequency
slightly lower for a dot, slightly higher for a dash, and leaving it alone for
the spaces.
When the information comprises changing values, such as speech,
music, or full motion video in analog, the modulator adjusts the carrier
amplitude or frequency or both continuously, in step with the value of the
information signal. When similar information is encoded digitally, as his
own mostly the case now with current technology, the modulation of the
carrier with the zeros and ones of the bits comprising the digitized signal
take modulator designers back to Morse code days. The value changes in
the information signal are vastly greater for a digitized video signal than
the frequency with which the dots dashes occurred in 1920-era
radiotelegraphy, but the modulation principles are the same.124
A principle from automatic control theory known as the Nyquist criterion
expresses the common-sense idea that a carrier signal cannot be modulated at a
rate faster than it is changing its self.125 In other words, one cannot modulate a
1 MHz carrier with a 2 MHz information signal. In particular, the Nyquist
sampling criterion126 says that the carrier frequency must be at least twice that
of the modulating signal. That means that frequencies for DROP-to-drone
communication must be higher, in proportion to the rate that information needs
to be transferred to or from them. A full-motion video signal in uncompressed
format requires 2.9 gigabits per second to deliver all the necessary information
in real time.127 That means that the carrier signal must be at least twice that or
5.8 Gigahertz. Some degree of compression is necessary to reduce the
bandwidth requirements.
122. Morse Code, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morse_code
123. Id.
124. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR AMATUER RADIO, HANDBOOK FOR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
Ch. 12 (2003) (explaining different modulation techniques). [hereinafter “ARRL Hanbook”] (explaining
different modulation techniques).
125. Nyquist criterion, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Nyquist_criterion
126. Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Mar. 23, 2015), http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyquist%E2%80%93Shannon_sampling_theorem.
127. Video Bitrate calculation for uncompressed video, STACK OVERFLOW (last visited Mar. 23,
2015), http://stackoverflow.com/questions/24163432/video-bitrate-calculation-for-uncompressed-video.
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Another theoretical principle, this one from information theorist
Claude Shannon at MIT,128 declares that the bandwidth required for a
signal increases in proportion to the rate the signal transmits information.
Thus a video signal requires more bandwidth than a Morse code signal.
The combination of the Nyquist criterion and the Shannon principle
drives the carrier frequencies necessary for drone RF signals upwards.
FCC licensing groups them in the 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz bands.129
ii.

Spread Spectrum Modulation

Spread-spectrum technology utilizes brief transmissions of the
modulated carrier on each of several frequencies, as many as 100 in some
implementations.130 It was developed initially by military and naval forces
to improve communication security and minimize interference. 131 Because
different pairs of transmitters and receivers use different sequences of
frequency selection, many communications can occur simultaneously on
the same set of hopping frequencies without interfering with each other.
FCC specifications for spread spectrum equipment, such as that used for
Wi-Fi in the 2.4 GHz band, sets strict limits on transmitter power in order
to reduce the potential for interference. That, combined with the relatively
short range of such transmitters at these frequencies, makes spread
spectrum Wi-Fi extremely flexible, thus allowing dozens of homes in the
same neighborhood to have their own Wi-Fi networks without interfering
with each other. For example, the 802.11g Wi-Fi standard uses spread
spectrum modulation in the 2.4 GHz band and has a maximum net data rate
of 54 megabits per second.132
It is the case, however, that, as the number of transmitters and receivers
increase attempting to use the same set of hopping frequencies, the potential for
interference and reduced speed of communication transfer occurs. Congestion
also occurs when some of the signals have high bit rates, such as that required for
video imagery. In the microdrone context, using the same spectrum band for

128. C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM TECH. J.
379 (1948) available at http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf.
129. See Federal Communications Commission, Infrastructure (U-NII), Devices in the 5
GHz Band, First Report and Order 3-14 (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/5ghz-u-nii-ro (reviewing decisions allocating spectrum for WiFi).
130.
Spread Spectrum, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Spread_spectrum
131. See ARRL Handbook, supra note 124, at 12.54 (explaining history of spread spectrum
modulation).
132. See Bradley Mitchell, Wireless Standards 802.11a, 802.11b/g/n, and 802.11ac: The 802.11
Family Explained, ABOUT TECH http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/wireless80211/a/aa80211
standard.htm (explaining specifications for different Wi-Fi standards).

PERRITT_DROP_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

SUMMER 2015]

DEVELOPING DROP DISCIPLINE

5/3/2015 5:02 PM

171

video downlink as well as for the control link significantly increases the potential
for interference, because the video signal has such a high information transfer
rate, that it uses more of the available bandwidth and can occupy most or all of the
spread spectrum hopping frequencies, thereby crowding out the control signal. If
GPS-based flight planning software is used to control drone position, the potential
for interference increases further. Accordingly, the better implementations put
control-link signals and telemetry on one band, either 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz and
video downlink signals on the other.
iii.

Propagation

Radio signals move through space differently depending on their frequency
and wavelength. Wavelength and frequency are inversely related: the higher the
frequency, the smaller the wavelength.133 For example, a 7 MHz frequency has a
wavelength of about 40 meters, and a 144 MHz signal has a wavelength of about
2 meters. Still higher frequencies have still shorter wavelengths; signals in the
2.4 GHz band have a wavelength of 12.5 centimeters.134
Propagation differences exist because the electromagnetic energy
comprising radio signals interacts with the molecules in the earth and the
atmosphere differently depending on their wavelengths. Also, they interact
differently depending on whether the molecules in the atmosphere are ionized,
as they are in the ionosphere.135
In general, and to oversimplify somewhat, very low frequency signals,
such as those used to communicate with U.S. Navy submarines, penetrate the
earth and are attenuated by the atmosphere. Medium frequency signals, such
as those used for the AM broadcast—515 to 1600 kHz—do not penetrate the
earth well, but they travel further in the atmosphere and, at night, when
ionization of the atmosphere is greater, they bounce off the ionosphere and are
capable of greater range. High-frequency signals, from 1.5 MHz to 30 MHz,
bounce off the ionosphere at different levels depending on time of day and
frequency. This reflection produces a phenomenon known as “skip” which
allows long-range global communication by these frequencies. VHF signals,
those from, 30 to about 200 MHz, and UHF signals, from 200 MHz to about 1
GHz, penetrate the ionosphere and do not skip. They are useful only for line of
sight communication. Above 1 GHz, the bottom of the microwave region,
signals are useful for line of sight, but they are progressively attenuated by the
atmosphere and precipitation in the atmosphere, with more attenuation as the
frequency increases. They also are more likely to be reflected by ground
objects such as foliage, structures, and vehicles.136

133. See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.1 (explaining fundamentals of radio waves).
134. See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.2 (giving formulas for converting between
frequency and waveleng; summarizing properties of different wavelengths).
135. See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.2-21.6 (explaining how atmosphere interacts
with radio waves to produce different propagation characteristics).
136. See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.4-21.6 (text box summarizing different
propagation characteristics of different wavelengths).
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Thus a 2.4 and 5.8 GHz signal are similar in their line of sight properties,
but are different, in that the 5.8 GHz signal suffers more attenuation by the
atmosphere and objects.
4.

Weather

Microdrone DROPs do not need the same level of understanding of
weather phenomena as do manned aircraft pilots. They fly their microdrones
within the line of sight, mostly in daytime, and in low-wind conditions. They
do not need to understand specific flight planning weather products,137 because
they can see for themselves how far they can fly their microdrones without
losing sight of them because of obscuration or cloud cover. They do not need
to understand weather prognosis beyond what is available from general
audience print and electronic media; they can see for themselves whether the
latest forecast is proving correct.
Their practical knowledge of what may make their vehicle uncontrollable
will cause them not to attempt flight in adverse weather conditions. The
circumstances for manned aircraft flight are entirely different. For one thing,
they occur over ranges of dozens or hundreds of miles, where the weather is
likely to be quite different from that at the takeoff point. For another, manned
aircraft pilots need to know the boundaries between visual flight rules
(“VFR”)138 and IFR,139 so that they can operate only within the limitations of
their aircraft and their pilot certificates. Moreover, much of aviation using
manned aircraft necessitates flying in an adverse weather conditions, in which
pilots must know how to control the aircraft by reference to instruments only,
must understand the complex system of air traffic control (ATC) IFR
clearances,140 and must know how to avoid icing, turbulence, and thunderstorm
activity even when they are legally operating under IFR in restricted visibility.
5.

Automation

Designing appropriate knowledge and skills requirements for automated
cockpits is challenging the FAA.141 The automation of flight systems of man
aircraft has accelerated greatly since the deployment of the first rudimentary
autopilot in 1923. Now, pilots of even the lowest level of general aviation
aircraft routinely use multi-axis autopilots, and full “glass panel” displays, in
which basic flight information such as airspeed, altitude, direction of flight,

137. FAA, Airman’s Information Manual 5-1-1.
138. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.151-91.161 (visual flight rules).
139. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.167-91.193 (instrument flight rules).
140. 14 C.F.R. § 91.173 (requiring ATC clearances).
141. See Lane Wallace, Flight School: Glass Panel Training, FLYING (June 29, 2010), http://www.
flyingmag.com/pilot-technique/new-pilots/flight-school-glass-panel-training (explaining differences in training
for two types of cockpit displays).
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aircraft pitch attitude, bank angles, and rates of turn, climb, and descent are
displayed digitally on a screen, rather than by separate “steam gauges,” in which
the same basic information was presented an analog form, usually by the
position of a needle.142
Glass panel instrumentation and the computers that drive them offer new
capabilities that reduce pilot workload. For example, a pilot flying an
instrument approach can select the approach from a database stored in the
system and fly it by hand with reference to a moving map display, or couple it
to the autopilot and let the autopilot fly the airplane down to certain minimum
altitudes.
Because the systems reduce pilot workload and improve the accuracy with
which navigation procedures can be executed, they potentially reduce risks. On
the other hand, there is growing recognition in the aviation community that cockpit
automation also adds new risks. First, overreliance on automation allows pilot
skills related to manual flying to atrophy, or that a pilot confronted with a system
anomaly or failure is less prepared to take over and maintain safe flight.
Second, the systems themselves and their interfaces are complicated,
typically involving dozens of menus arranged in hierarchies that are not always
intuitive. To make effective and safe use of such systems, pilots must be able
quickly to change what is displayed on the screen, enter new data, and confirm
its accuracy. The number of choices and their accessibility on different menus
easily can overwhelm a pilot who is not completely familiar with that
particular system or in stressful situations, such as an emergency. Fumbling
with or misunderstanding automated flight control systems is what happened
in the Asiana crash in San Francisco,143 and the Air France crash in the
Atlantic Ocean.144
The debate about how to change training, knowledge, and skills
requirements to reduce risks of these types of accidents has not yet crystallized
into regulations. Some steps have been taken to require additional training of
Airline Transport Pilot for aircraft upsets, emphasizing quick recognition of an
unsafe condition such an incipient stall, and immediate appropriate responses.145
Dealing with the problem of the human interface with highly automated
systems, however, has been less comprehensive and robust, limited to a few
changes in certification requirements for avionic systems.146

142. See The Great Debate: are glass cockpits better?, AIR FACTS (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://airfactsjournal. com/2012/01/the-great-debate-are-glass-cockpits-better/ (online debate among pilots
about merits of glass panel displays).
143. BOARD MEETING: CRASH OF ASIANA FLIGHT 214 ACCIDENT REPORT SUMMARY, NAT’L.
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB IDENTIFICATION: DCA13MA120 (June 24, 2014) available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=20130707X83745&key=1&queryId=975ad
d42-dbf9-4b6d-a88a-8c2be55551d0& pgno=2&pgsize=50.
144. See William Langewiesche, The Human Factor, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2014) (probing
factors that caused Air France crash).
145. 14 C.F.R. § 61.156(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (2015) (requiring upset and stall recovery training).
146. See VITA Technologies, DO-178C: Improved certification for cost-effective
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One reason it is so difficult to develop appropriate training and testing
requirements for automated cockpits is that the way in which information is
displayed, and the way in which systems are controlled varies significantly
between different commercial products. Building specific product characteristics
into governmentally imposed regulatory requirements limits competition and
inhibits innovation. This is a relatively new problem. While the cockpit layouts
differ significantly between an Airbus 340 and a Boeing 767, and those of a
Diamond Twin Star differ significantly from those of a Mooney M20, the
similarities are greater than the differences. The pilot has a stick, yoke, or
joystick to control pitch and bank of the airplane, rudder pedals to control yaw,
and some kind of throttle or fuel control lever to control thrust.
The challenges for regulation related to cockpit automation are considerable,
and aviation safety depends upon appropriate FAA and vendor responses.
For microdrones, however, the problem is qualitatively different in two
respects. First, safe control of the aircraft depends entirely on the correct operation
of automation systems. For automatic hover, or autonomous return to home, no
DROP input is involved. The system does it entirely on its own, directly
controlling the propulsion and control systems on the aircraft. System
malfunction is not something the DROP can correct for by manually flying the
aircraft.
Second, in some respects, autonomous control features reduce necessary
DROP skills. Hovering a helicopter is quite difficult for primary flight students.
Usually they do not master it until eight or nine hours of flight instruction. This is
not the case with microdrones, especially those with autonomous hover capability.
Onboard accelerometers, magnetometers, and GPS receivers and computers
automatically send appropriate control inputs to the electric motors powering the
rotors to keep the vehicle stationary over a particular point on the ground. The
DROP need do nothing; indeed, on the DJI Phantom and some of its competitors,
automatic hover occurs whenever the DROP releases the controls altogether.147
What this means for knowledge, skill, and training requirements is
that (1) the DROP must be completely familiar with how the flight control
systems work and how his inputs influence their operation; (2) he must
know about the types of malfunctions that may occur, such as loss of a GPS
signal, how the systems will respond, and whether he can provide any
control input that will render the aircraft safe in such circumstances; (3)
how inspections before and after flight can reduce the likelihood of system
malfunction and (4) the need to be attentive to software and hardware
upgrades provided by the vendor when he becomes aware of system
avionics systems, http://vita.opensystemsmedia.com/articles/do-178c-certification-costeffectiveavionics-systems/ (explaining trends in certification of avionics systems).
147. See DJI, PHANTOM 2 USER MANUAL V1.4 at 16 (2015) (explaining that vehicle automatically
hovers when sticks are centered).
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deficiencies. These requirements are not altogether different for those pilots
of manned aircraft, but they involve different kinds of risks and different kinds
of responses.
6.

Drone Systems, with an Emphasis on Controls Links

Microdrones are highly automated. Unlike in an airplane or helicopter,
control inputs by the operator do not directly move control surfaces, change
pitch, or increase torque. Instead, DROP control imports are fed through the
computers on the control board, which combines them with sensor data about
aircraft position, speed, and direction of flight and decides what adjustments
should be made to motor current to implement the DROP commands. A
DROP, far more than a pilot, needs to understand the basic operation of the
control systems on the microdrone.
The DROP also must understand the steps to calibrate the magnetometer and
the GPS navigation system before the microdrone is launched. The magnetometer
must learn which way is north, its orientation when it is level with respect to the
earth, and its launching position so it knows where “home” is. If the vehicle is not
calibrated accurately before it is flown, it may be uncontrollable, and its return to
home feature may take it to an unpredictable place.
For the Phantom, GPS calibration involves ensuring that the vehicle is
sitting level when power is applied and waiting until its lights flash in a
particular pattern. Magnetometer calibration involves picking the vehicle up
and spinning it several directions until a different pattern of lights is complete.
The calibration process differs from model to model, and the DROP must
understand it for the particular model he is operating.148
7.

Drone Emergency Procedures

The emergency procedures that DROPs must understand are different
from those that pilots must understand. Pilots must understand how flight may
be continued safely if an engine fails, through autorotation in a helicopter, and
by maintaining a speed above stall speed in an airplane while it glides to a safe
landing.149 DROPs do not need to know this because microdrones are
unlikely to experience engine failures and, in any event, can neither glide
nor autorotate. Pilots need to understand the dangers of flying into weather
conditions that reduce visibility; DROPs need not, they only need to
understand the NPRM’s requirement that they fly only when visibility is
good enough to maintain line of sight.150

148.
See e.g., DJI, PHANTOM 2 USER MANUAL V1.4 at 23 (2015) (specifying calibration process).
149. See FAA, Private Pilot Practical Test Standards for Rotorcraft-Helicopter (July
2005) (requiring demonstration of proficiency in autorotation).
150. NPRM, supra note 2, at § 107.31 (limiting operations to line of sight).
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DROPs do need to know how to deal with loss of the wireless control
link and with battery exhaustion.151 Pilots do not need to know this because
airplanes and helicopters have neither control links nor battery-powered
propulsion systems.
C. Skills
A baseline justification for any skills training and testing should be that that
the student should be able to practice each knowledge element. If a knowledge
element is justifiable by its relationship to a discrete risk, it does little good
unless a DROP can put it into practice. If a bit of knowledge need not be
practiced, it cannot be justified as a requirement.
To satisfy skill requirements for certification, DROP candidates should be
able to demonstrate that they consistently can keep the microdrone under control,
make it go where they want it to, and avoid objects that might interfere with
flight or the integrity of the control link, or suffer injury or damage. As with any
skill, proficiency requires practice. The NPRM leaves the details of skills
training and testing up to the institutional operator.152
Based on the co-authors’ experience in flying airplanes and helicopters, on
co-author Sprague’s experience giving flight instruction, on their experience in
flying various models of microdrone, and advising others on flying them, a total
of 10 hours seems the right level of experience. Ten hours of total flight time
equates to about 30 flights of a Phantom-class microdrone – more flights for one
with less endurance. That is surely enough to master procedures including
calibration, operation of the automation features, keeping the drone in sight,
and maintaining control of it. Indeed, 30 supervised flights in an airplane or
helicopter is about the level required of a private pilot candidate, because
instructional and student solo flights usually take about an hour each.
Beyond accumulating the requisite total flight time, DROP candidates
should practice and demonstrate their skill at handling particular situations.
They should be able to judge how high 500 feet above the ground is, and how far
away 1000 feet is, without having to rely on telemetry from the microdrone.
They should be able to maintain control of the microdrone regardless of which
way it is pointing. Later models of the Phantom and the Inspire have an
operating mode that is indifferent to drone orientation with respect to the DROP,
153
but in case he flies a model without this feature, or the feature doesn’t work
properly, he needs to be able to apply control imports as though he were aboard
151. NPRM, supra note 2, at 79-80 (discussing mitigation of loss-of-control risk).
152. NPRM, supra note 2 at 100-103 (explaining decision not to require skills testing and
aeronautical experience).
153. See DJIPhantom, Intelligent Orientation Control (Apr. 21, 2015) http://www.djiphantom.co/
category/intelligent-orientation-control.html (explaining how Phantom can be configured to accept
commands relative to DROP's position rather than relative to vehicle orientation).
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the aircraft, facing in whatever direction the drone is pointing. That might mean
pushing the cyclic stick forward to cause of the drone to go to the DROP’s left, if
the drone has yawed 90 degrees to the left, or pushing the cyclic forward to make
the drone come back toward him if its nose has yawed 180 degrees.
He also needs to demonstrate safe reactions if the drone flies behind an
object obstructing his view of it. He should show his proficiency in triggering
return to home or disabling return to home if he wishes to regain manual control.
He should practice and demonstrate mastery of various modes of flight and
triggers for them, such as switching between attitude and GPS mode, setting
height and range limitations, programming a flight plan on a map display and
modifying it or interrupting it while the drone is executing the plan.
When DROPs operate the camera as well as flying the drone, they should
demonstrate proficiency in performing both tasks while remaining within line of
sight and within altitude and distance limitations.
D. Observers
The NPRM wisely omits the requirement, imposed in all the section 333
exemptions, for an observer separate from the DROP.154
The co-authors have flown as both pilots and copilots in several different
types of airplanes and helicopters and have flown and observed flights of various
models of microdrone. In an airplane or helicopter, it is convenient to have a
second pilot, or even a non-pilot passenger. The second person can help keep a
watch for potentially conflicting traffic, enter radio frequencies, activate flaps
and other systems, and if properly qualified and upon request of the pilot take
over the controls while the pilot performs a non-flying task such as shedding a
jacket or entering navigational data.
For microdrone flight, an observer performs no useful function—except
keeping the DROP company. If the DROP loses sight of the aircraft, the fact
that the observer can still see it makes little difference. It is not physically
possible for two people to manipulate the controls on the small DROPCON used
for microdrones. It is difficult for a second person to get a clear view of the
DROPCON screen without putting his head in the DROP’s way.
VII. A proposal for DROP certification
A. Basic Requirements
Requiring certification of DROPs provides a number of advantages. It is a
mechanism for delivering training and assuring a certain level of knowledge and
skills that can improve safe operation of drones. It permits the FAA to know

154. NPRM, supra note 2, at 63 (discussing visual observer and emphasizing that none is
required).
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who is flying them. It also gives the FAA leverage to enforce its regulations,
because it gives the DROP an asset—his DROP certificate—that he must retain
in order to keep flying. Being able to take adverse action against a certificate
holder who violates the rules puts the FAA in a much stronger enforcement
position then if it must track down initially unknown violators and impose civil
penalties against them.
It is also true, however, that any form of certificate requirements imposes a
barrier to entry by DROPs that does not now exist. Thousands of individuals
have purchased microdrones and are flying them, many undoubtedly for
commercial purposes. If they are not deterred by the FAA’s outright ban, they
are unlikely to comply with a new requirement that they stop flying until they get
DROP certificates. Some of them will, but not all.
This potential for widespread noncompliance is reduced by the NPRM’s
certification strategy that adjusts the level of requirement for certification
according to the level of drone to be flown under a particular class of certificate.
The UAS America Fund, it its petition for rule making,155 presents a good idea:
for very small microdrones, no significant training or testing would be
required.156
If more is thought to be necessary, DROPs could be required simply to
register with the FAA or to take a short online quiz administered by the vendor.
The quiz would not be difficult; it would be comparable to a typical driver’s
license written test, designed to assure basic knowledge of the rules and of safe
practices. For heavier, more complex drones with higher performance in terms
of range, altitude, speed, more knowledge and skills training and testing would
be required. At the high end, the requirements would be modeled on the
requirements for manned aircraft pilot certificates, perhaps at the commercial
level, but with content tailored to the risks involved in machodrone flight rather
than those associated with airplane or helicopter flight.
However DROP training, testing, and certification requirements are
imposed, policy makers must determine the content of the requirements. The
following two subsections summarize the NPRM’s requirement for knowledge
testing and take existing requirements for private-pilot skills and annotates them
to make them suitable for DROP certification.

155. Petition of UAS America Fund, LLC (“UAS Fund”) to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to Implement
Operational Requirements for Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-1087-0001 [hereinafter “UAS America Fund Petition”].
156. UAS America Fund Petition, supra note 155 at 14 (describing knowledge test proposal
as only test requirement).
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Knowledge Requirements

This subsection sets forth the black-letter knowledge requirements from the
NPRM. These requirements track the discussion of knowledge requirements in
section 0 well.
(1) Applicable regulations relating to small unmanned aircraft system
rating privileges, limitations, and flight operation;
(2) Airspace classification and operating requirements, obstacle
clearance requirements, and flight restrictions affecting small unmanned
aircraft operation;
(3) Official sources of weather and effects of weather on small unmanned
aircraft performance;
(4) Small unmanned aircraft system loading and performance;
(5) Emergency procedures;
(6) Crew resource management;
(7) Radio communication procedures;
(8) Determining the performance of small unmanned aircraft;
(9) Physiological effects of drugs and alcohol;
(10) Aeronautical decision-making and judgment; and
(11) Airport operations.157
2.

Skills Requirements

This subsection takes the black-letter private-pilot flight proficiency
requirements from 14 C.F.R. § 61.107 and annotates them to produce a set of
skills requirements suitable for DROPs.
(a) General. A person who applies for a private pilot DROP
certificate must receive and log ground and flight training from an
authorized instructor on the areas of operation of this section that
apply to the sUAS category and class rating sought.
(b) Areas of operation.
(1) For an airplane category rating with a single-engine
class rating:
(i) Preflight preparation;
(ii) Preflight procedures;
(iii) Airport and seaplane base operations;
(iv) Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds hovering;
(v) Performance maneuvers:
Maintaining line of sight;
Maintaining control link;

157.

NPRM, supra note 2, at § 107.73 (Initial and recurrent knowledge tests).
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Maintaining attitude control despite sUAS
orientation;
Flying from point-to-point;
(vi) Ground reference maneuvers;
(vii) Navigation;
(viii) Slow flight and stalls;
(ix) Basic instrument maneuvers;
(x) Emergency operations:
Loss of control link;
Battery exhaustion
(xi) Night operations, except as provided in §61.110 of
this part; and
(xii) Postflight procedures.
B. Training and Testing Infrastructure
Responsibility for implementation any licensing program for DROPs
requires infrastructure to implement it. A considerable infrastructure already
exists for manned aircraft flight training, and the NPRM adopts it for DROP
knowledge testing,158 some parts of which could be adapted relatively easily to
accommodate DROP training. Some 500 flight schools exist in the United
States accredited by the FAA under Part 141.159 Many more, almost one at
every airport, operate without specific flight school designation and without
detailed supervision of their curricular content and teaching methods. Instead,
their activities are governed by Part 61160 and Part 91.161 Part 61 prescribes the
stages in training programs for different levels of pilot certificate, the content
of ground instruction162, knowledge tests, 163 the content of flight training,164
and – along with the FAA’s practical test standards documents165—the content
of practical test checkride.166 CFIs have incentives to graduate a certain
number of students who pass their knowledge and practical on the first

158. NPRM, supra note 2, at 107-110 (explaining how DROP test will be administered).
159. 14 C.F.R. § 141 (2013). See http://av-info.faa.gov/PilotSchool.asp (listing accredited
flight schools).
160. 14 C.F.R. § 61 (2013).
161. 14 C.F.R. § 91 (2015).
162. 14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a)-(b) (2013); 14 C.F.R. § 61.107(a)(b) (2013).
163. 14 C.F.R. § 61.35 (a) (2013).
164. 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(c) (2013).
165. Federal Aviation Administration, https://www.faa.gov/training_ testing/testing/ test_standards/
(last visited March 22, 2015) (describing and making available practical test standards).
166. 14 C.F.R. § 61.43(a)-(f) (2013) (specifying content of checkout).
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attempt.167 The knowledge tests themselves are designed by the FAA and its
contractors and administered at designated private designated test centers.168
Practical test check rides are administered mostly by DPEs,169 CFIs who
have been selected by the FAA to represent the agency in this capacity and
who exercise authority on behalf of the FAA administrator when they are
giving the test.170
One cannot simply assign DROP skills training and testing to this
infrastructure, because its components have no experience with drones—and
not necessarily any interest in training their operators. A handful of flight
schools are adding drone programs,171 as are several of the established
aeronautical universities.172 Additionally, some universities not specializing in
aviation have added DROP programs.173
Before one can flesh out the infrastructure for DROP training two crucial
personnel decisions must be made and the pipeline needs to fill in response to
the decisions. The first is: Who will be the instructors? Existing CFI’s and
ground instructors? A new category of CFI and ground instructors? Or will
DROP training be the responsibility of someone else?
Second, who will be the DROP examiners? Existing DPEs or someone
else? It may be tempting simply to say that DROPS must take training—
whatever is prescribed—from currently certified CFIs, and that they must pass
practical test rides administered by currently designated pilot examiners. There
are some advantages to using existing personnel; a part of their training and
certification involves mastery of teaching techniques and national security
screening. The problem with that approach is that the current stock of CFIs and
DPEs have no knowledge or experience with drones, and many of them have no
interest in acquiring that knowledge and experience. A CFI with a rotary wing
rating is not authorized to give flight instruction in a fixed wing aircraft, and
many have no interest in doing so. The markets for rotary- and fixed-wing
instruction are largely separate. There’s no reason to think that the market for
DROP instruction will be any less separate.
The technical aspects of current CFI and DPE expertise, however, map
poorly to DROP training, as the evaluation of existing pilot skills standards in
section VII.A.2 makes clear.

167. 14 C.F.R. § 61.197(a)(2)(i) (2013) (CFI renewal based on student success rate).
168. 14 C.F.R. § 61.33 (2013) (describing test administration); Conduct of Airman Knowledge
Tests, FAA, http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId =37E322DFC7FF65D68 52571AA00575D58 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describing private test centers).
169. 14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE).
170. 14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE authority).
171. See, e.g., Aviation, NORTHWESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, https://www.nmc.edu/
programs/academic-programs/aviation/index.html (last visited on Mar. 30, 2015).
172. See, e.g., Daytona Beach Campus, EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY,
http://daytonabeach.erau.edu/degrees/bachelor/unmanned-aircraft-systems-science/.
173. See, e.g., Aviation, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA, http://aviation.und.edu/Prospective
Students/Undergraduate/uasops.aspx.
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An obvious alternative is to erect a system of manufacturer-run training.
Drone manufacturers such as DJ I would set up their own network of DROP
training schools. There is no reason that cannot also train DROPs for other
drone models as well; that would be left up to negotiation among vendors in the
marketplace. The advantage of this approach is that manufacturers know better
than anyone else the characteristics of their flight vehicles and the details of their
automatic systems. They likely have their own test pilots who have experience
with the vehicles rivaling anyone else’s.
Two major disadvantages exist for this approach, however. First, only the
larger manufacturers would have the resources to do flight training effectively;
yet the market is quite competitive and fragmented among many different
designers and vendors. Competition is healthy in any marketplace, and a
training requirement that would tend to squeeze out the smaller players is not
desirable policy.
Second, even the larger vendors would be unlikely to set up DROP training
academies at more than one or two locations. Having to travel halfway across
the country and make arrangements for lodging away from home would
represent a significant barrier to DROP entry.
Looking to private organizations for DROP skills certification activities is
desirable because it opens up more possibilities for building a community of
DROPs in which peer group pressure can reinforce safe practices and skill
development, and because the private sector has greater flexibility in decisionmaking, compared with governmental agencies.
A number of models exist for this. One of the most interesting is the
Professional Association of Dive Instructors (“PADI”). PADI emerged in 1966
because of a perception by its founders that the existing organizations offering
training and certification of scuba divers were poorly organized and not very
effective.174 It has grown into an elaborate organization that offers diver
certification at multiple levels.175 It is difficult for a diver to rent diving gear
unless she can show a certificate of completion of at least the basic course.
There is almost no governmental involvement; the market enforces the
requirements, backed up by the possibility of liability and insurance requirements.
There is no reason that a PADI-like organization cannot be erected for
DROPs. Similar to PADI, it would offer memberships, recruit instructors,
administer training programs and standards for certifying them, and issue
instructor certificates. It would pair certified instructors with divers or wouldbe divers. It would develop tests that could be administered directly by
instructors or online. It would issue certificates of completion of various levels
of instruction and testing.
174. PADI History, PADI, http://www.padi.com/scuba-diving/about-padi/padi-history/ (last
visited on Mar. 30, 2015).
175. PADI Open Water Diver Course, PADI, http://www.padi.com/Scuba-Diving/padicourses/course-catalog/open-water-diver/ (last visited on Mar. 30, 2015).
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Other models can be adapted from lifeguard certification—a process in
most states administered by the nongovernmental Red Cross and backed up by
hiring practices for lifeguards.176 Also helpful is young hunter, motorboat,
snowmobile education and testing requirements in states like Illinois. Under
these programs, the requirement for certification is expressed in statute and
enforced by the state Department of Natural Resources, but mostly private
instructors certified by the DNR conduct the training itself.177 In Illinois,
young hunters may not obtain a hunting license unless the hunter successfully
completes a hunter safety course approved by the Department of Natural
Resources.178 The Illinois Department of Natural Resources administers four
mandatory safety education courses, in boating, hunting, trapping, and
snowmobiling.179 The hunting course comprises 10 hours of instruction and
successful completion of a final exam.180 Course completion entitles the
graduate to a Hunter Education Certificate of Competency.
The boating course is required before a person between the ages of 12 and
18 can operate a motorboat. It comprises 8 hours of instruction. Like the
hunting course, it can be completed online. The snowmobile course is similar
to the boating course, except that it is required for the age span 12-16.181
C. American Association of Drone Instructors
As section 0 and Seeking Law Abiding Drones182 explain, formal law is
only part of the set of rules with which citizens comply. Citizens also conform
their conduct to other norms that they have been socialized to respect: for
example, taking hats off inside, saying “please,” and “thank you,” offering to
share the cost of a restaurant meal. Professional and industry organizations adopt
codes of good practice; some, as section VIII.B explains, providing training,
testing, and certification programs.
The most promising infrastructure for training, testing, and certification of
microdrone and perhaps for machodrone DROPs as well, would be modeled on
PADI, Red Cross lifeguard certification, and loosely on licensing of physicians and
attorneys. It would draw upon and strengthen the private center of gravity of
manned aircraft pilot licensing, as well.
176. Lifeguarding, AMERICAN RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.org/take-a-class/programhighlights/lifeguarding (last visited on Mar. 30, 2015).
177. ILLINOIS DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, SAFETY EDUCATION (2015) http://www.dnr.illinois.
gov/safety/Pages/default.aspx (explaining certification programs for young hunters, archers, snowmobile
and boating operators).
178. 520 ILCS 5/3.1-9; 3.2, (providing for certificate of competency by persons completing courses
taught by Department personnel or “certified volunteer instructors”).
179. Safety: Safety Education, ILL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.dnr.illinois.gov/
safety/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
180. Safety: Hunter Safety, ILL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.dnr.illinois.gov/ safety/
Pages/HunterSafety.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
181. Safety: Snowmobile Safety, ILL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.dnr.illinois.gov/
safety/Pages/SnowmobileSafety.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
182. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996).

PERRITT_DROP_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

184

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

5/3/2015 5:02 PM

[Vol. 7:2

Preparing DROPs for safe operation of microdrones would be the
responsibility of a private association tentatively known as AADI—American
Association of Drone Instructors. AADI would be a private nonprofit
membership organization organized under the laws of one or more states. It
would have four classes of members: DROP instructors, DROP candidates,
qualified drops, and other interested persons.
Its governing body, whether denominated Board of Directors or Board of
Trustees, would be controlled by persons selected by the membership, but would
also have representation from key stakeholders in the microdrone industry and
the aviation community, including representatives of state and local government,
manned aircraft pilots, the airlines, and general aviation organizations. It might
be chartered as a federal advisory committee to the FAA, although this is not
necessary to its success.
AADI would develop detailed curricula for DROP training, follow the
NPRM specifications for DROP knowledge, develop skills standards, and would
offer training materials in book and online form and practical test standards for
DROP skills testing.
Initially, AADI would recruit and qualify a cadre of DROP instructors. At
the beginning, CFIs would train DROP instructors, working from its curricula and
training materials and test standards rather than from existing part 61 requirements
for pilots. As soon as a DROP instructor has been certified as satisfying the
requirements, the responsibility for training DROPs would be shared between
certified DROP instructors and CFI’s. As soon as a DROP instructor has been
certified, he would begin training DROP candidates. No particular critical mass is
necessary before training could begin.
AADI would maintain a database of certifications. Once a DROP
instructor certifies a DROP candidate, the instructor would submit an online
form that automatically would cause an entry to be made in the database. AADI
would periodically audit, on an essentially random basis the training and testing
activities of its instructors.
AADI also would maintain a database of drone complaints that could be
filed by anyone on a standard but simple form that would identify time, place,
and basic information such as the risk perceived by the reporting person or
entity, and flight profiles such as height above the ground, speed, direction of
flight, and proximity to other aircraft or to persons or property on the ground.
Both the database of certified DROP instructors and DROPs and the database of
complaints would be available to the public through AADI’s web site.
Many private associations exist in the United States, and they attract widely
varying degrees of attachment from their members. Some—Aircraft Owner and
Pilot’s Association (AOPA) might be a good example—are prominent advocates
of the interests of their members, but do not have much gravitational pull
psychologically. Members pay dues to support AOPA’s lobbying and educational
activities, but membership events do not occupy a prominent part of their lives; nor
do they identify strongly with the organization. Others, like many religious
organizations, have strong bonds with their members. Still others wax and wane
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over their lives in the strength of attachment, while others, like American political
parties, have some with weak attachment, for whom party membership is just a
convenient way to label their political preferences, and others who are
passionately involved in political campaigns, party caucuses, primaries and
other organizational and candidate selection and platform writing activities.
AADI would pursue a strategy that would place it at the higher end of
member bonding. This is necessary for several reasons. First, AADI’s status and
credibility must be such that it induces DROP candidates to participate in AADI’s
training and testing activities and to seek AADI certification. Second, members
need to care enough about AADI as an umbrella for their professionalism for peer
support, and AADI criteria must be credible enough that it is the primary reference
point for good operating practices. In other words AADI must be a community,
whose members care about each other. Third, suspension or revocation of AADI
certification must matter, and loss of AADI membership must have consequences.
AADI would offer coffee mugs, caps, bumper stickers, and pens with the
AADI logo. It would sponsor blogs for DROP instructors, certified DROPs, and
DROP candidates on its website and be active in social media. It also would
sponsor live meetings around the country at which vendors and others could
demonstrate new products and provide technical and marketing seminars.
One way to assure these hallmarks of success is effective organization purely
in the private sector. PADI and the Red Cross (for its lifeguard certification), for
example, do not enjoy any governmental imprimatur. Even though no federal or
state rules require SCUBA divers to get PADI certification, they do it anyway.
One reason is that diving equipment rental enterprises view PADI certification is
an easy way of assuring that the customer is unlikely to have an accident that
would result, at least, in the loss of equipment, and might result in litigation and
insurance claims.183
No governmental imprimatur requires network engineers to have Microsoft
or Cisco certification of their skills, but the operation of supply and demand in
the labor market gives certificate holders a perceived advantage in hiring and
advancement.184
Alternatively, AADI could be linked more explicitly to regulatory
requirements. The linkage might be similar to that imposed by bar admissions
agencies, usually specialized regulatory agencies exercising governmental power
under the authority of a state’s highest court,185 and law schools.186 In most

183.
See PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DIVING INSTRUCTORS, WHY PADI, (2015)
http://www.padi.com/scuba-diving/about-padi/why-choose-padi/ (explaining advantages of PADI
certification).
184. See MICROSOFT, THE ADVANTAGES OF OFFICIAL MICROSOFT AND CISCO CERTIFICATION
TRAINING COURSES, (2015) https://social.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/4d8c5191-8db0-4d7c-accc99e83e8e0d16/the-advantages-of-official-microsoft-and-cisco-certification-trainingcourses?forum=CertGeneral.
185. See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (describing board of bar admissions
appointed by state supreme court), http://www.state.il.us/ court/SupremeCourt/ Rules/Art_VII/
artVII.htm.
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states, no one may take the bar exam or be admitted to the bar except upon proof
of graduation from an accredited law school.187 The accreditation process for all
schools is itself private.
The FAA and state aviation authorities would require the possession of
AADI certification to fly microdrone, just as Illinois requires possession of
firearms or snowmobile certification, leaving the certification process almost
entirely up to private entities.
This degree of governmental involvement, while it may be necessary to
reassure the public as to the integrity of the certification process, raises both
delegation-doctrine and antitrust issues as when any private association exercises
quasi-governmental authority. Delegation-doctrine concerns could be satisfied in
either one of two ways, or by a combination of both. First, any governmental
penalties for drone operations without AADI certification would be imposed only
after a de-novo investigation, notice, and hearing by the governmental authority.
The certification by AADI, or lack thereof would operate as a legal presumption in
the adjudicatory enforcement proceeding. AADI certification would be primafacie evidence of qualification; absence of certification would be prima-facie
evidence of lack of qualification to operate the microdrone without violating the
ban against reckless operation under the CFRs.188 But the respondent would be
legally entitled to rebut the presumption that AADI certification was necessary.
Under the second approach AADI would function and relate to its members
as any private association would, free of governmental requirements or restraints,
but the FAA would not impose governmental sanctions for violation of AADI
rules themselves. Instead, AADI would be constituted as a federal advisory
committee, and the FAA would regularly take AADI standards and issue them as
proposed FAA rules, followed by notice and comment rulemaking. This is the
process statutorily approved for negotiating rulemaking.189
Under this approach, delegation-doctrine problems would be eliminated,
because private organizations would not be making or enforcing rule via
governmental power; the government would. The obvious disadvantage is that
the prospect of governmental adoption and codification of AADI rules and
processes would devalue the AADI content unless and until it has been
formally embraced by the FAA, and that process could take many months or
years, depending on the level of controversy.

186. See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 703(b) (eff. July 1, 1992) (requiring graduation from ABAapproved lawschool), http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_VII/artVII.htm.
187. Id.
188. 14 CFR § 91.13 (2014) (prohibiting careless and reckless operation).
189. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal
Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States,
74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1642-1647 (1986).
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The antitrust strictures are more easily accommodated. In a series of cases,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Radiant Burner190 has been fleshed out in the
context of many controversies over private standard-setting organizations. The
antitrust concern is that dominant firms in an industry would seize a standardsetting organization and use its standards to exclude competitors.191
To prevent this, the Radiant Burner case law,192 and several Justice
Department safe-harbor guidelines193 require the following: (1) Open membership;
(2) Transparency of standards development processes, and (3) Justification of the
content of standards or rules adopted by the organization194
The end result is not unlike that imposed by the Administrative Procedure
Act on federal agencies; rulemaking must be rational, open for public input,
explicitly justified in terms of logic and evidence.195 Adjudicatory procedures
must offer the basic ingredients of a procedural due process.196
To be sure, organizing and maintaining a private association, especially one
intended significantly to affect member behavior, is challenging.197 But AADI’s
organizers, mindful of the literature on organization viability, would embrace a
strategy likely to achieve success.
As section IV explains the government, through the FAA, could reinforce
the viability of an organization like AADI, while avoiding delegation and
antitrust problems by requiring that DROPs be a member of some organization
and satisfy its certification requirements. It would define the characteristics of
the certifying organization without mandating membership in any particular one.
This would allow the market to adapt and allow for new association entrants to
innovate and improve on the services offered by existing organizations, much as
PADI emerged when its founders believed they could do better than existing
diver certification bodies.

190. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
191. Id. at 658.
192. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982); Allied Tube & Conduct Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
193. See Hill B. Wellford, Antitrust Issues in Standard Setting, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222236.htm (March 29, 2007) (reviewing DOJ policy on
standards setting organizations).
194. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 287 (explaining criteria for standard setting resulting from Radiant
Burners and its progeny).
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Cape Code Hospital v. Sibelius, 630 F.3d 203, 211-212 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (vacating rule on Medicare reimbursement of hospitals because agency failed to give
sufficient consideration to comments).
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 556-557.
197. See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (explaining social and economic dynamics that tend to undercut
effective functioning of large groups).
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Although the financial aspects of AADI are beyond the scope of this article,
its financial viability would be assured by combination of membership fees,
testing fees, certification fees, and charitable donations from interested parties.
The AADI concept is useful regardless of shifting interpretations of the
boundary between federal, state, and local control, depending on how
preemption and commerce clause doctrines evolve in light of the fact that most
microdrone flight has minimal effect on interstate commerce and that most of the
safety and privacy concerns are strictly local.

***

